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CASES NOTED
the income tax laws.17 The tendency of the courts (starting with Corn
Products) to give the word "property" a narrow construction28 should
cause the prudent attorney to take a close look at the nature of the
"property" being assigned to a charity before advising his client that the
assignment will result in no realization of income to him.
CLAUDE L. EICHEL
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
TO A VOID CONVEYANCE OF HOMESTEAD.
A sister sued her brother in equity in 1957 to obtain cancellation of
two deeds executed in 1930. The first deed, which was executed jointly
by the parents, conveyed homestead property held singularly by the
father to the brother. The second deed was a reconveyance of the home-
stead by the brother to the parents to create an estate by the entirety.
Both conveyances were without consideration. The brother contended
that his sister's action! was barred by section 95.23 of the Florida
Statutes,' since the deed reconveying the homestead to the parents had
been of record without adverse claim for more than twenty years. How-
ever, the trial court held the conveyance void as an ineffective attempt
to alienate homestead property without consideration and allowed the
sister's action.2 On rehearing,3 the Florida Supreme Court held, affirmed:
section 95.23 is not applicable to a void deed or to a deed transferring
homestead property in violation of the constitutional provisions' regu-
27. L.O. 1118, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 148 (1923): "On. account of the clear purpose of
Congress in enacting the charitable contributions section and the express language used
permitting a taxpayer to deduct charitable gifts ... , it is not considered that Congress
intended to tax indirectly any unrealized appreciation in the value of property given to
charitable organizations ...."
28. Kaltreider v. Comm'r, 255 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1958) (subdivision case); Pennroad
Corp. v. Comm'r, 228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1958) (sales of land acquired in .1828); Simonsen
Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 243 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1957) (sales of purchased war surplus wire) ;
Charlie Hilliard, 31 T.C. 961 (1959) (sale of cars used in car rental business) ; Rev. Rul.
58-77, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 118 (deposits retained on containers used by manufacturer in
shipping its products and not returned by customers).
1. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1961) provides:
Limitations where deed or will of record for twenty years or more.-After the
lapse of twenty years from the record of any deed or the probate of any will pur-
porting to convey lands no person shall assert any claims to such lands as against
the claimants under such deed or will, or their successors in title.
After the lapse of twenty years all such deeds or wills shall be deemed valid
and effectual for conveying the lands therein described, as against all persons who
have not asserted by competent record title an adverse claim.
2. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal.
Reed v. Fain, 122 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
3. In its original adjudication of the Reed case, the supreme court. reversed the deci-
sion of the district court, but on rehearing the decision of the district court was affirmed.
4. FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 4.
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lating homestead conveyances. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 864 (Fla.
1962) (on rehearing).
Section 95.23 was enacted in 1925' to attain greater certainty in
Florida land titles.' The statute is peculiar to Florida and has no exact
counterpart in any other state due to its consolidation of the substantive
elements of a statute of limitations 7 and a curative act.' The first para-
graph of section 95.23 is a statute of limitations, requiring that any
adverse claim to the transactions specified in the statute be made within
a stated time after their consummation.? Paragraph two is a curative act,
validating these transactions against all persons who have not asserted
an adverse claim.10 Section 95.23 has been classified as a "curative act
with a limitation provision""1 to distinguish it from other "curative"
legislation in Florida.12
Although the Florida Supreme Court has consistently construed
section 95.23 to validate and render unimpeachable a deed of record for
twenty years against all persons who have not asserted an adverse claim
by competent record,"3 it has clearly recognized that some title defects
5. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10171, §§ 1, 2.
6. Day, Curative Acts and Limitations Acts Designed to Remedy Defects in Florida
Land Titles, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 365 (1955), 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 145 (1956); Rogers, Florida
Curative Acts, 22 FLA. B.J. 153, 156 (1948).
7. A statute of limitations has been defined as "the restriction by statute of the right
of action to certain periods of time, after the accruing of the cause of action, beyond which
it will not be allowed." Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 282
Pa. 362, 127 Atl. 845 (1925). See also People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 48 Cal. App. 72,
191 Pac. 1004 (1920) ; Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E.2d 482 (1938).
8. A curative act has been defined as "one intended to give legal effect to some past
act or transaction which is ineffective because of neglect to comply with some requirement
of law." Carle v. Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061, 104 S.W.2d 445 (1937); Anderson v. Lehmkuhl, 119
Neb. 451, 229 N.W. 773 (1930). See also Boyer, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
§ 14.13 (1961) ; Day, supra note 6.
9. The first paragraph of section 95.23 reads in its pertinent part: "After the lapse of
twenty years from the record of any deed ...no person shall assert any claim ...under
such deed . . . ." For an excellent discussion of the act's scope, see Moyer v. Clark, 72
So.2d 905, 907, 908 (Fla. 1954).
10. The statute's second paragraph reads in its pertinent part: "After the lapse of
twenty years all such deeds ... shall be deemed valid and effectual ... as against all
persons who have not asserted by competent record title an adverse claim." See Moyer v.
Clark, 72 So.2d 905, 907, 908 (Fla. 1954).
11. This highly descriptive term was coined by Professor Day, supra note 6, 9 U. FLA.
L. REV. at 145 (1956).
12. See Boyer, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.13 (1961). Some typical
examples of curative legislation in Florida include statutes that: validate tax deeds which
have been of record for twenty years or more (§ 196.09) ; cure deeds defective for want
of witness or lack of seal after the lapse of seven years (§ 694.08) or ten years (§ 95.26)
from recording; invalidate old executory contracts which have not been cleared of record
(§ 95.35 and § 695.20); minimize the effect of discrepancies in names of deeds after a
period of ten years (§ 689.19) ; and impose a statute of limitations on the enforcement of
mechanics' liens (§ 84.21) and mortgages (§§ 95.28, 95.30, 95.32 and 95.34).
13. Grable v. Nunez, 64 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1953); Robinson v. Herrman, 101 Fla. 865,
132 So. 827 (1931) ;, Montgomery v. Carlton, 99 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930).
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are beyond the act's remedial power. Thus, in Wright v. Blocker,14 the
court held that the legislature intended section 95.23 to be inapplicable
to forged (void) deeds. However, in Barnott v. Proctor15 the court held
that the statute validated a deed of homestead property unlawfully
executed by a husband to his wife through a straw man, notwithstanding
the fact that any conveyance of homestead which violates a constitution-
ally protected interest 6 is void in Florida." Similarly, in Thompson v.
Thompson," it was held that a deed unlawfully alienating homestead
property which had been of record for more than twenty years was
protected from attack by section 95.23.
It would appear from the decisions in Barnott and Thompson that
deeds of record for more than twenty years are within the act's remedial
power even though made in violation of the homestead laws. However,
in Reed v. Fain" the Florida Supreme Court reached a contrary result.
In the supreme court's original adjudication of the Reed case, the
majority strictly construed the limitation provision of section 95.23. It
held that the twenty-year period prescribed by the act, during which any
adverse claims must be asserted against the questioned deed, begins to
run from the date of record.20 The supreme court then analyzed the con-
struction of section 95.23 as expressed in the dissent of the district
court.2 1 In that dissenting opinion the twenty year provision of the act
was viewed as not beginning to run until the party asserting the adverse
claim against the recorded instrument had a cause of action.22 In the
instant case, the sister did not have a cause of action until her "inchoate"
interest in her father's homestead became vested at the time of his
death. Consequently, to hold "that the twenty year [limitation] period
could run before the accrual of a right of action adverse to the recorded
instrument . . ." would make the act unconstitutional.2 4 However, the
majority of the supreme court in its initial decision concluded that the
views contained in the district court's dissent were not applicable in the
instant case, and stated that the sister could have sued in equity to pro-
tect her interest in the father's homestead during the twenty years
following the recordation of the 1930 deed.25 It therefore held that its
14. 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940).
15. 128 Fla. 63, 174 So. 404 (1937).
16. See FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 4.
17. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931); Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107
So. 255 (1925); Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924); Hutchinson v. Stone, 79
Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
18. 70 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1954).
19. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962) (on rehearing).
20. Id. at 861. See also note 7, supra and accompanying text.
21. See note 2 supra.
22. Note 18 supra. This construction is based on the views expressed by Professor Day,
supra note 6.
23. FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1961).
24. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1962) (on rehearing).
25. Ibid.
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decisions in Barnott and Thompson were controlling and denied the
plaintiff's action. 6
In a vigorous dissent to the original majority opinion in Reed, Justice
Drew essentially agreed with the construction of section 95.23 advocated
in the district court's dissent. He said that, under Florida law, the sister
had no interest which would entitle her to maintain an action against the
questioned deed of the father's homestead during his lifetime. 7 He recog-
nized "that the deed involved in this litigation was void,"2 and concluded
that the construction of section 95.23 in this fact situation "is an involved
and highly important question. Some of the cases confuse rather than
clarify the issues."29
On rehearing, the court held that the legislature did not intend
section 95.23 to apply to a "void deed""0 or to a conveyance of homestead
property." It recognized that the deed executed in 1930 by the parents,
wrongfully attempting to convert homestead property into an estate by
the entirety, was void.12 The court clearly said, "The entire transaction
between the parents and their son was a nullity because it was violative
of the constitutional inhibitions regarding the alienation of homestead
property. 8 8
Noteworthy is the court's unequivocal recognition that the interest
of the "heir" (the sister) in her father's homestead property was guar-
anteed and protected from a void conveyance by the Florida Constitu-
tion. This was an explicit reversal of the court's decision in Thompson,"4
and evinced a clear acceptance by the court of the constitutional limita-
tions of section 95.23: The statute is not applicable to conveyances which
seek to avoid the normal rules relative to the descent of a homestead."
The judicial somersault performed by the court to achieve the final
26. Id. at 862.
j7. Id. at 863.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 864.
30. Ibid. The court reasoned that since its holding in Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428,
198 So. 88 (1940) (i.e., that it was not the intent of the Legislature for section 95.23 to
apply to a void deed) has not caused the statute to be amended by the Legislature to
include void deeds, "[Tlhis Court was correct in its expressed thought with reference to
the. legislative intent."
31. Id. at 864-65. "The Legislature originally would have normally and specifically
included homestead property had it intended such type of property to be embraced by
Section F.S. 95.23, F.S.A."
32. Id. at 865.
33. Ibid.
34. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. The court stated in Reed v. Fain, 145
So.2d 858, 869 (Fla. 1962) (on rehearing): "In our opinion, the simple, correct and direct
method of clarifying our conflicting decisions upon the vital and controlling question posed
in this case is to, and we do . . .repudiate our opinion . . .in Thompson ......
35. Id. at 871. "Florida Statute section 95.23 is unconstitutional if it be construed in
such a manner as to breathe life into an instrument made and executed in contravention
of constitutional inhibitions."
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determination of Reed illustrates a basic confusion regarding the proper
interpretation and construction of section 95.23. A careful reading of
the entire opinion indicates that the majority agree with the ultimate
conclusions of Justice Drew and essentially accept his rationale, but are
reluctant to admit it in view of their original holding.
It would appear antithetical to the legislative intent that a curative
act with a limitation provision would serve to validate a transaction
explicitly proscribed by constitutional provision. It is submitted that the
court was correct in precluding the application of section 95.23 to a
conveyance of homestead made in violation of the heir's constitutionally
protected interest. In the opinion of this writer, the Florida courts must
continue to confer deferential treatment upon homestead property in
view of its constitutionally protected status.
ALBERT L. CARRICARTE
